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Abstract Mobile ad hoc networks are vulnerable to a large group of attacks, e.g.,
wormhole attacks. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure to prevent wormhole
attacks. We utilize analytical hierarchy process to elect some special nodes, named
the local most trustable nodes, for the source and the destination node, respectively.
The elected nodes are then required to implement our proposed scheme to prevent
wormhole attacks. The proposed scheme cannot only detect wormhole attacks, but
also locate wormhole nodes, i.e., identify the malicious nodes that behave wormhole
attacks. To solve the colluding wormhole attack, we present a countermeasure named
bi-directional wormhole location mechanism.
Keywords Mobile ad hoc networks · Wormhole · Analytical hierarchy process ·
Local most trustable node
1 Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [1–5] consists of a collection of wireless mobile
nodes that communicate with each other without the use of any network infrastruc-
ture. Compared to other types of wireless networks, MANETs are more vulnerable
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to a large group of attacks due to their unique characteristics [6]. In this paper, we
focus on preventing wormhole attacks. In wormhole attacks, a wormhole consists of
two colluding malicious nodes so-called wormhole nodes, which are usually far from
each other, and a tunnel between them. The tunnel could be a dedicated communica-
tion medium such as long range wireless devices [7]. One wormhole node captures
routing traffic at one point of the network and tunnels them to its peer wormhole
node at another point. Hence, the network topology is corrupted and routing is com-
promised. Because wormhole nodes need not to modify or create new packets, no
cryptographic technique [8, 9] can prevent wormhole attacks.
A wormhole node (W1) encapsulates packets and sends them to its peer wormhole
node (W2) through the path between them. Afterward, W2 obtains the original packets
extracted from the encapsulated packets, which is known as decapsulation. Because
the original packets are encapsulated, they are not changed by intermediate nodes
along the path between W1 and W2. Hence, it seems as if W2 got the packets directly
from W1 with the same hop count [10] although they are commonly many hops far
away from each other. Hence, the path with wormhole nodes are likely shorter than
other normal paths. Therefore, senders prefer to choose the path with wormhole nodes
as the routing path than other normal paths to transmit packets.
In this paper, we present a countermeasure against wormhole attacks in MANETs.
We list the innovations and contributions of our paper as follows: (1) Special hard-
ware, e.g., directional antenna or synchronized clock, is not required. This merit
makes the proposed scheme more suitable for MANETs and easier to be employed
in realistic networks. (2) In MANETs, it is unreasonable to treat any node to be se-
cure without any proof. However, in many literatures, either source or destination is
assumed to be secure and treated as a monitor or a detector for detecting wormhole
attacks. The proposed scheme conforms to the requirement of MAENTs, i.e., every
node has the uniform security level. In the proposed scheme, we treat source and des-
tination as normal nodes without security priority. (3) The proposed scheme can not
only detect wormhole attacks but also locate the wormhole nodes. (4) We originally
introduce LMT nodes of source and destination, respectively, so as to implement
the prevention of wormhole attacks. By this tactic, the assumption that source or the
destination is always secure is not required. At the same time, by using AHP method-
ology to elect LMT nodes, the security priority of the LMT nodes is reasonable.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work.
Section 3 proposes an algorithm using analytical hierarchy process (AHP) methodol-
ogy to elect two local most trustable (LMT) nodes for the source and the destination,
respectively, which implement the prevention of wormhole attacks. Section 4 presents
the details of the countermeasure. Section 5 concludes the paper and presents our fu-
ture works.
2 Related work
In [11], two mechanisms are introduced to detect wormhole attacks: temporal packet
leashes and geographical packet leashes. In temporal leashes, accurate clock syn-
chronized clocks are used to restrict the propagation time of packets. In geographic
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leashes, loose clock synchronization and location information are used to restrict the
migration distance of packets. However the clock synchronization and location infor-
mation must be obtained via extra hardware, e.g., GPS or other positioning systems
[12–14]. Moreover, both temporal and geographical leashes are required to add au-
thentication information to each packet, which take up huge amounts of storage.
In [15], directional antennas are used to prevent wormhole attacks. Nodes use
directional antennas to transmit packets to their neighbor nodes in a particular direc-
tion. It is also assumed that all antennas on nodes are aligned. The process of neighbor
discovery is implemented in a secure way using directional antennas. However, it is
probably infeasible to deploy directional and aligned antennas on all of mobile nodes
in practice.
In [16], a statistical analysis of multipath (SAM) is proposed to detect wormhole
attacks in the network adopting multi-path routing protocol. Due to tunneling by
wormhole nodes, the number of hops of the path with wormhole nodes appears to
be smaller than normal paths. Thus, the routing path with the wormhole nodes is
more attractive to routing discovery of the sources. Through statistics calculation of
relative frequency of each routing path, the path that has the biggest relative frequency
is identified as the path with the wormhole nodes. However, the drawback is that, in
non-multipath routing protocol e.g., AODV, this proposal cannot work.
In [17], the authors propose a secure routing protocol based on the AODV routing
protocol: Wormhole Avoidance Routing Protocol (WARP). It does not require any
hardware. It considers link-disjoint multi-paths during path discovery, and provides
greater path selections to avoid malicious nodes, but eventually uses only one path
to transmit data. Based on the characteristic that wormhole nodes can easily grab
the route from source node to destination node, WARP enables the neighbors of the
wormhole nodes to discover that the wormhole nodes have abnormal path attractions.
Then, the wormhole nodes would be gradually isolated by their normal neighboring
nodes, and finally be quarantined by whole network. However, some nodes may be
misjudged to be wormhole nodes because they are located at the key positions of
connectivity within the network.
In our previous work [18], we proposed a time-based mechanism to prevent worm-
hole attacks in MANETs. Although, special hardware or synchronization system is
not required in [18], we made an assumption in [18] which is not always realistic that
the source node and the destination node are trustable. However, the assumption is
not quite in accord with actual conditions, i.e., the requirement of MAENTs requires
that each node in MAENTs has the same security level. In our proposed scheme, one
of the main improvements is that we treat the source node and the destination node
as normal nodes without any extra assumption.
3 Preliminaries: electing LMT node
A LMT node is the node with the largest weight value in the vicinity of the source
or the destination. The decision for the election of LMT node involves many metrics,
including relative stability (Sr ), credit value (Cv) and reciprocal of forward rate (Rf ),
which need to be traded off, as shown in Fig. 1. We use AHP methodology, a theory of
measurement through pair-wise comparisons and priority scales, to elect LMT node.
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Fig. 1 Hierarchical structure
3.1 Preparatory work
Firstly, we propose a novel algorithm using AHP methodology [19] to calculate
weight values [20] of nodes in the neighborhood of the source and the destination.
The nodes with maximum weight values in the vicinity of the source and the destina-
tion are elected as the LMT nodes for the source and the destination, respectively. In
this subsection, we introduce three parameters which together determine the weight
values of the nodes in the vicinity of the source and the destination, including Sr , Cv
and Rf . Sr is evaluated based on the change rate of neighbors. It is a relative value
as the name of the parameter implies. It indicates if the node moves relatively fast
or slowly or even stable compared with its neighbors. Cv is evaluated based on the
packet transmission behavior of nodes. It indicates whether the nodes behave misbe-
havior by dropping packets or not. Rf is evaluated based on the packet forwarding
rate. It indicates whether the nodes violate the backoff mechanism [21] specified by
DCF in 802.11 so that they have the higher opportunity to jam the wireless channel,
or the nodes perform wormhole attacks that shrink the hop count of the routing path to
trap the passing packets. It also indicates the amount of the remaining battery power
of node since frequent packet forwarding could enhance the rate of battery power
consumption. In brief, the node, which remains relatively stable or moves slowly and
exhibits normal behavior and has lower forwarding rate, has the higher opportunity
to be elected as the LMT node for the source or the destination. Conversely, the node,
which moves fast or performs malicious behavior (i.e., dropping packets) or has larger
forwarding rate, has the lower opportunity to be the LMT node.
Due to the limitation of the paper length, in this paper, we do not depict each
parameters function and evaluation procedure. One of the calculation methods is pro-
posed in our previous paper [21].
3.2 Calculation of node’s weight
In this subsection, the calculation of weight value of node will be presented by con-
sidering the three parameters.
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The decision of LMT node election involves many metrics. To do that, they have
to be measured, i.e., metrics whose measurements must also be evaluated as to how
well they serve the objectives of the decision of LMT node maker. The Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a theory of measurement through pair-wise comparisons
and relies on the judgments of experts to derive priority scales. It is these scales that
measure intangibles in relative terms. The comparisons are made using a scale of
absolute judgments that represents, how much more one element dominates another
with respect to a given attribute. The judgments may be inconsistent, and how to
measure inconsistency and improve the judgments, when possible to obtain better
consistency is a concern of the AHP. The derived priority scales are synthesized by
multiplying them by the priority of their parent nodes and adding for all such nodes.
To make a decision of LMT node election in an organized way to generate priori-
ties, we decompose the decision into the following four steps [19]:
Step 1: Define the problem.
The decision problem is to select a proper node by considering corresponding
weight value to be the LMT node among the one-hop vicinity of either source or
destination in the environment of MANETs.
Step 2: Structure the decision hierarchy from the top with the goal of the decision,
then the objectives from a broad perspective, through the intermediate levels (criteria
on which subsequent elements depend) to the lowest level (which usually is a set of
the alternatives).
As Fig. 1 shown, the problem is structured as a hierarchy. The overall objective
of choosing an appropriate LMT node is placed at the topmost goal of the hierarchy.
The subsequent level representing the main criteria are termed as secondary goal.
The three secondary goals are Sr , Cv , and Rf . Finally, alternatives are placed in the
bottom level, which are evaluated for the selection of LMT node.
Step 3: Construct a set of pair-wise comparison matrices.
To make comparisons, we need a scale of numbers that indicates how many times
more important or dominant one element is over another element with respect to the
criterion or property with respect to which they are compared. Table 1 exhibits the
scale.
Table 1 The fundamental scale of absolute numbers
Intensity of importance Definition Explanation
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective
2 Weak or slight Experience and judgment slightly favor one
activity over another3 Moderate importance
4 Moderate plus Experience and judgment strongly favor one
activity over another5 Strong importance
6 Strong plus An activity is favored very strongly over another;
its dominance demonstrated in practice7 Very strong
8 Very, very strong The evidence favoring one activity over another
is of the highest possible order of affirmation9 Extreme importance
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The reciprocal matrix is constructed through pair-wise comparison of each crite-
rion against another that exists under the topmost goal. The values of the pair-wise
comparison matrices are provided through answering the questions which has got
more preference and, by how much. The following criteria matrix A gives the pair-
wise comparison results of three criteria towards the top most goals. The value aij
denotes the strength of preference of ith criteria over j th criteria. The fundamental
1 to 9 scale is utilized to express the strength of preference based on the intuition,
experience and knowledge and it is shown in Table 1. The A matrix is as follows in
Eq. (1):
















By using mean normalization of row vector, the A can be standardized to a nor-









where k is the number of criteria. In the proposed scheme, three parameters are re-
ferred as the criteria for evaluating the weight value of node, so k is equal to 3.
Then, by the mean normalization of row vector, we can get the normalized vector
WTi , as shown in Eq. (3), which stands for the weight factoring of each criterion.









where anormij is the ith row and j th column element of Anorm.
All the pair-wise comparison matrices are checked for its consistency. Due to peo-
ple’s random judgments matrices may be prone to judgments errors that can be de-
tected by Consistency Ratio (CR) that is defined as the ratio of Consistency Index
(CI) to Random Index (RI). CI can be calculated by Eq. (4) and it is shown for a
criteria matrix C as an instance. After the calculation of weight of each criterion, the
consistency should be considered.
CI = λ − n
n − 1 (4)
where n denotes the number of elements to be compared in criteria matrix A, here it
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Table 2 Random index
Exponent number 1 2 3 4 5 6
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24
where wi is the weight factoring of each criterion calculated by the aforementioned
Eq. (3).
Finally we can obtain the consistency ratio (CR) which is the ratio between CI and
RI, as shown in Eq. (7). RI is shown in Table 2.
When CR < 0.1, the consistency of matrix is really high and acceptable, i.e., judg-
ment errors are tolerable, otherwise, the pair-wise matrix undergoes some adjust-




Step 4: For each criterion in the second level, we need to compute weights for
nodes under respective criterion by using same way applied in step 3. Use the prior-
ities obtained from the comparisons to weigh the priorities in the level immediately
below. Do this for every element. Then for each element in the level below add its
weighed values and obtain its overall or global priority. Continue this process of
weighing and adding until the final priorities of the alternatives in the bottom most
level are obtained. The local weight is computed for each criterion and alternatives.
After calculating the weight of each criterion, we should calculate the weight of
node in the same calculation process. In our LMT node election process, three crite-
ria are considered, i.e., Sr , Cv and Rf . We need compare nodes in the vicinity from
every perspective of each criterion. Hence, we can obtain the following three matrix,
i.e., ASr , ACv and ARf , which are local weights factor of the corresponding parame-
ters, as shown in Eqs. (8), (9), and (10). To make a clear and intuitive explanation, we
assume there are only three nodes in the vicinity, i.e., node 1 (n1), node 2 (n2), and
node 3 (n3). The ASr stands for the pairwise comparisons of nodes in vicinity accord-
ing to Sr . The ACv stands for the pairwise comparisons of nodes in vicinity according
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By using the similar process of calculation of WTi , we can obtain every node’s weight
factor on the corresponding criterion as follows in Eq. (11):






























wj · αij (12)
The global weight of a mobile node is achieved through multiplying its local
weight by its corresponding parent weights. Hence, finally by Eq. (12), we can obtain





where Wn1 is the weight of node 1 by considering all of the criteria. For example,
Wn1 = WSr · αSrn1 + WCv · αCvn1 + WRf · αRfn1 .
Since we’ve already obtain the global weight of each node in the vicinity of the
source and the destination, the LMT nodes can be elected. For instance, n3 has the
largest weight value, i.e., Wn3 is the largest one among Wn1 , Wn2 and Wn3 ; therefore
n3 is elected as the LMT node.
4 Countermeasures against wormhole attacks
By the aforementioned election algorithm, the node in the vicinity of the source or the
destination with the largest weight value is elected as the corresponding LMT node.
The LMT nodes then perform the countermeasure to prevent wormhole attacks. In
this section, we present the countermeasure consisting of three phases. The first one
is detection phase that detects the existence of wormhole attacks. If wormhole attacks
are detected, the second phase, i.e., location phase described in Sect. 4.2, is triggered
to identify the specific wormhole nodes. The third phase, i.e., bidirectional location
described in Sect. 4.3, is presented to solve the collaborative wormhole issue.
4.1 Phase one: detecting wormhole attacks
As mentioned in Sect. 1, wormhole nodes use tunnel to connect each other to make
the routers between two wormhole nodes invisible. Thus, the hop count of the path
with wormhole attacks usually appears to be smaller than other normal paths. Conse-
quently, the paths with wormhole attacks are more attractive to the source. Although
we assume the basic routing protocol employed in the network is AODV [22], the
proposed scheme can be extended to other routing protocols, e.g., DSR, OLSR. The
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proposed scheme detects wormhole attacks by comparing two types of hop count.
One is extracted from the head of Route Reply (RREP) packet which is polluted by
wormhole nodes. In AODV, RREP is sent by the destination after receiving RREQ
(Route Request) packet sent by the source. Another hop count is estimated by us,
which is the approximation of the actual number of hops between the source and the
destination.
Step 1: Timer setting.
After the routing discovery process by AODV between the source and the destina-
tion, the routing path is selected. Before data transmission through the selected rout-
ing path, the LMT node in the vicinity of the source sends a HELLO message whose
destination is the LMT node of destination node via the selected routing path. The
LMT node of the source sets a timer when it sends the HELLO message. Once the
LMT node of the destination receives the HELLO, it is required to send a HELLO
REPLY message back to the LMT node of the source via the inverse routing path.
When the LMT node of the source receives the HELLO REPLY, it stops the timer.
The period from sending the HELLO to receiving the HELLO REPLY is the round
trip time (RTT) between the source and destination, donated as TRTT.
Step 2: Minimum hop estimating.
In this step, the minimum hop count between the source and the destination is
estimated.
First, the distance (D) between the source and the destination can be evaluated
by Eq. (14).





+ δ = TRTT × v − 2 × r
2
+ δ (14)
where δ is the maximum relative error caused by the channel condition, and v is the
speed of light. r is the mean value of node’s transmission range.
Then, the estimated hop count (H ) between the source and the destination can be


















where r is the upper bound of transmission range.









Step 3: Hop testing.
Hr denotes the hop count extracted from the received RREP. If there are wormhole
attacks in the selected routing path, Hr cannot represent the actual hop count between
the source and the destination, since wormhole tunnel makes the nodes between the
source and the destination invisible. Once the LMT node of source estimates Hmin,
it compares Hr with Hmin, if Hr < Hmin, the LMT node of the source can judge
338 F. Shi et al.
that there is wormhole attacks in the selected routing path; otherwise, the originator
selects a shortest path among those routes with the property that Hr ≥ Hmin.
4.2 Phase two: locating wormhole nodes
Once wormhole attack is detected by the LMT node of the source in phase one, the
location phase is triggered. The purpose of location phase is to identify wormhole
nodes.
Step 1: Timer setting.
The LMT node of the source temporarily enables the path with wormhole attacks
and sends a TRACE message along the selected routing path towards the LMT node
of the destination. Meanwhile, a timer is initialized by the LMT node of the source.
For each intermediate node in the route path, when it receives the TRACE, it replies
a TRACE REPLY message to the LMT node of the source via the inverse path pig-
gybacking its hop count. Meanwhile, the TRACE is forwarded by each intermediate
node via the route path. When the LMT node of the source receives the TRACE
REPLY from each intermediate node, the RTT between the source and each interme-
diate node can be evaluated by referring to the timer. A scenario is given in Fig. 2
as an example. For each intermediate node (A, W1, W2, B), after receiving TRACE,
each of them reply a TRACE REPLY piggybacking the corresponding hop count.
Note that this piggybacked hop count could be polluted by wormhole nodes using the
tunneling.
Step 2: Hop testing.
After receiving each TRACE REPLY, the LMT node of the source estimates the
corresponding increase of hop count for each intermediate node. If the increase of
hop count at one intermediate node is not the one comparing to its previous hop, the
current node and its previous node are identified as the wormhole nodes.
To illustrate this process intuitively, we use the scenario in Fig. 2. The LMT node
of source S sends a TRACE. The intermediate node A then receives it and replies
a TRACE REPLY to S piggybacking A’s hop count (HA). Meanwhile, A relays
TRACE to its next-hop neighbor towards destination. As to other intermediate nodes
(W1, W2 and B), the same process is continued until TRACE reaches the LMT node
of destination.
Fig. 2 Wormhole location mechanism
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We take W2 as an example. The distance (Dsw2 ) between source S and intermedi-
ate node W2 can be estimated by the LMT node of the source using Eq. (17) that is
similar with Eq. (14).
Dsw2 =
(TSW 2 − 2 × rv ) × v
2
+ δ = TSW 2 × v − 2 × r
2
+ δ (17)
where TSW2 is the RTT between S and W2.
The minimum hop count (Hmin _sw2 ) between S and W2 can be evaluated by








The hop count of W2 piggybacked by the TRACE REPLY sent by W2 is presented
as HW2 . If HW2 < Hmin _sw2 , the LMT node of source S can judge that W2 and its
previous node, i.e., W1, are wormhole nodes.
The reason to separate the proposed scheme into detection phase and location
phase is that location phase is more time consuming than detection phase. Majority
of nodes in the network is normal node and minority is malicious node. Even though
the wormhole nodes attract routing traffic, only a few paths are the ones with worm-
hole nodes. Thus, only when the selected routing path is detected as the path with
wormhole nodes, will the location phase be triggered to identify the corresponding
wormhole nodes. By this way, the consumption of time and other resources could be
reduced, while the wormhole attacks could also be well prevented.
There is a potential issue in the aforementioned location mechanism, which is col-
laborative wormhole issue. As we mentioned that the intermediate nodes are required
to reply TRACE REPLY back to the source node after receiving the TRACE message,
so that the source can evaluate the RTT between the source and each intermediate
node. However, for the purpose of concealing the behavior of wormhole attacks and
avoiding being identified, wormhole nodes may pretend to be normal nodes. Here we
present each node’s TRACE REPLY by using “REP” plus “_” plus the identifier of
the corresponding node, e.g., REP_W2 denotes the TRACE REPLY of W2. For exam-
ple, in Fig. 3, the wormhole node W1 could fabricate the REP_W2 substituting for W2
and send this fake REP_W2 to the LMT node of the source at a proper time point. We
define proper time point as the time that makes TSW 2 smaller than it should actually
be in order to make HW2 > Hmin _SW 2 . Meanwhile, W2 performs in a collaborative
Fig. 3 Wormhole location mechanism preventing collaborative wormhole
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way, i.e., it doesn’t send any TRACE REPLY for the TRACE, but simply forwards
the TRACE to its next hop node. Through the fabrication of REP_W2 by node W1, it
seems as if W2 were in the vicinity of W1, i.e., W ′2, as shown in Fig. 3. In addition, by
the collaboration between W1 and W2, they could successfully avoid being identified
by the LMT node of source using the aforementioned location mechanism in phase
two. To solve this issue, we propose the phase three.
4.3 Phase three: bidirectional location mechanism
To solve the collaborative wormhole issue, we proposed a mechanism named bidi-
rectional location as follows:
Step 1, Step 2: Step 1 and step 2 are the same with the corresponding steps (Timer
Setting and Hop Testing) in Sect. 4.2. If wormhole nodes can’t be identified, the
process goes to Step 3.
Step 3: The LMT node of the source stores intermediate nodes’ RTT information.
Step 4: The LMT node of source sends the intermediates’ RTT information to the
LMT node of destination via a secure path. We define secure path as the path without
wormholes. There are two cases as follows:
Case 1: The LMT node of the source has multiple paths to the LMT node of the
destination besides the path including wormhole nodes, which are built during the
routing discovery process. In this case, the LMT node of the source chooses another
path without wormhole nodes to transmit the intermediates’ RTT information to the
LMT node of the destination.
Case 2: The LMT node of the source node has only one path to the LMT node
of the destination, which includes wormhole nodes. In this case, in order to transmit
the intermediates’ RTT information to the LMT node of the destination securely, the
LMT node of the source is required to initiate a new routing discovery process to find
a new path without wormholes and use the path to transmit the intermediates’ RTT
information.
Step 5: This step is similar with step 1 in Sect. 4.2 whose function is to evaluate the
RTT between the destination and each intermediate node. One difference is that here
TRACE is sent by the LMT node of the destination in the inverse direction of the same
route path mentioned in both phase one and two. Another difference is that the timers
are set by the LMT node of the destination. The other difference is that intermediate
nodes reply TRACE REPLY messages to the LMT node of the destination, as shown
in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 Bidirectional wormhole location
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Step 6: The LMT node of the destination makes the judgment for identifying
wormhole nodes based on the following two sub-steps:
Sub-step 6.1: This sub-step is similar with step 2 in Sect. 4.2 whose function is
to specify the wormhole node according to Eqs. (31) and (32). The difference is that
the LMT node of the destination performs the judgment. Thus, TSW2 in Eqs. (31)
and (32) is replaced by TDW1 that represents the RTT between D and W1; Dsw2
in Eq. (31) is replaced by DDW1 that represents the distance between D and W1;
Hmin _sw2 is replaced by Hmin _DW1 that represents the minimum hop count between
D and W1. If HW1 < Hmin _DW1 , W1 and its previous node, i.e., W2, are wormhole
nodes; otherwise, the process goes to sub-step 6.2. Herein, HW1 is the hop count be-
tween W1 and destination D which is piggybacked in the TRACE REPLY (REP_W1)
required to be sent by W1 and probably fabricated by W2 to reply the TRACE sent
by the LMT node of D. Through the fabrication of REP_W1 by W2, it seems as if
W1 is in the vicinity of node W2, i.e., W ′1 in Fig. 4. Hence, the following sub-step
6.2 is required to check the symmetry of the routing path between the source and the
destination.
Sub-step 6.2: If wormholes could not be located in sub-step 6.1, it means that the
collaboration wormhole attack exists as we explained above in which W2 has fab-
ricated the TRACE REPLY (REP_W1) for W1. If TSW1 + TDW ′1 = TSD + δ, which
means that the path is symmetrical, step 6 is iterated to check the following left nodes
until the wormhole nodes are identified; otherwise, if TSW1 +TDW ′1 = TSD +δ, which
means the path is unsymmetrical caused by the fake TRACE REPLY (REP_W1) fab-
ricated by the collaborative wormhole nodes, the LMT nodes can identify that W1
and W2 are wormhole nodes. Herein, TSW1 is the RTT between S and W1. TDW ′1 is
the RTT between D and W1 which is fabricated by the collaborative node W2. TSD
is the RTT between S and D. δ is the error of the symmetric path.
Figure 5 concludes the process of the proposed bidirectional wormhole location
mechanism.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we propose a scheme to prevent wormhole attacks in MANETs. The
proposed scheme can not only detect wormhole attacks, but locate wormhole nodes.
To solve the potential issue in the location phase, i.e., collaborative wormhole, we
propose a bidirectional location mechanism.
However, our scheme has an overhead to calculate the weight value. (1) For our
LMT election algorithm, when no transmission exists at initial time, the number of
packets actually forwarded and the number of packets expected to be forwarded can-
not be determined. Thus, the credit value and the reciprocal of forward rate can-
not be evaluated at initial time. The values can be evaluated only after a period of
transmission, which causes delay in the evaluation of the weight value of each node.
(2) When a node moves to a new neighborhood, the node becomes a stranger to
its neighbors. Hence, the node’s weight value must be recalculated, and the prob-
lem mentioned above may arise again. If the node moves frequently, this problem
may become more serious. However, the stability value is a variable of the weight
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Fig. 5 Flow chart of bidirectional location
value function in our scheme. If the node moves frequently, its stability value will be
small. Accordingly, the weight value of the node will be small, which means that the
node will not become the LMT node with the largest weight value in the neighbor-
hood.
In the near future, our research work will concern about the following aspects:
(1) We will consider more parameters into the calculation of node’s weight, like cu-
mulative time during which the node has worked as the LMT node. Cumulative time
implies node stability that increases the stability of the LMT node. The purpose of
including more parameters is to enhance the LMT node’s stability and reduce the
frequencies of reelection of the LMT node. We will measure more parameters and
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choose more important and rightful ones in order to make the balance between the
rightness of the selection of LMT node and efficiency of weight calculation and ex-
change. (2) We will apply the proposed scheme on preventing other misbehaviors in
MANETs, e.g., blackhole attacks [23] where the malicious node could attract all or
most packets and then misuses those packets, and MAC layer attacks [21] where the
malicious node could violate the MAC layer protocol. (3) In the near future, we plan
to use Network Simulator version 2 (NS-2) to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed scheme. We will compare it with our previous scheme [18] and AODV [22].
The simulation will be implemented in two scenarios, i.e., network without wormhole
attacks and network with wormhole attacks, respectively. In the former scenario, we
intend to evaluate how much the network throughput is reduced along with the raise
of traffic loads by using our scheme. In the latter scenario, we’d like to measure how
much the packets delivery rate is enhanced due to the wormhole prevention by using
our scheme.
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